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This Article is about the relationship between technology and society in fundamental 
rights theory. So far, the discussion about law and technology has generally been one-
directional within the most relevant branches of the social sciences; scholars of the law 
have been treating technology as a black box when conducting their analyses or 
developing their theories. In turn, science and technology studies have considered law 
and regulation as a closed book, which is unsatisfactory as well. Reductionist and 
compartmentalized theorizing is particularly problematic when it comes to conceiving 
a fundamental rights theory that is able to cope with challenges of the Internet. Guided 
by Niklas Luhmann’s autopoietic systems theory, this Article offers novel perspectives 
that aim at theoretically explaining how affordances can be conceptualized within 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The current discussion about the relationship between law and technology is 
unsatisfactory in the relevant branches of the social sciences. Legal scholars tend to 
treat technologies as a black box when conducting analyses or designing theories. 
Accordingly, they are blind with regard to the role of affordances — that is, the 
opportunities for action that are built into an environment — in the relationship 
between law and technologies. Scholars of science and technology studies (STS) in 
turn have been treating law and regulation as a closed book rather than considering 
their built-in dynamics, which is unsatisfactory as well. Reductionist and 
compartmentalized theorizing is particularly problematic when it comes to 
conceptualizing a fundamental rights theory that is able to cope with the challenges 
of the digital networked ecosphere. 
This Article attempts to develop a theory of “digital fundamental rights” that 
addresses the issue of affordances with regard to communicative freedom online. 
The contemporary discourse of fundamental rights practice generally focuses on civil 
liberties, conceived as individual rights in need of protection from state interference. 
However, over the last decades, an influential strand of philosophical legal thinking 
has been advocating for a replacement of the rights-conceived-as-liberties-approach 
with a new perspective that is conceiving rights as capabilities. Within this strand 
Amartya Sen1 and Martha Nussbaum2 have been the most influential voices.3 More 
recently, Julie Cohen has argued that this debate is unsatisfactory in the networked 
environment as it does not address the role of affordances in the exercise of 
fundamental rights. Rather than simply extending the rights-as-capabilities-approach 
to the technological realm she advocates a rights-as-affordances-discourse that 
considers the socio-technical constraints and affordances as preconditions for the 
exercise of the “freedoms and capabilities that people in fact enjoy.”4 To illustrate the 
implications of such an approach with an example, she refers to the discussion about 
privacy and data protection in the European Union. Cohen claims that the current 
debate in Europe tends to consider consent as the ultimate legitimation of privacy 
intrusions and finds this reasoning to come from a rights-as-liberties-approach. 
Arguably, when adopting a rights-as-affordances-approach one would need to 
acknowledge that “effective data protection is first and foremost a matter of design.”5 
She further argues that affordances would also need to be factored into a rights-as-
capabilities-approach. As a consequence, we would be required to ask about the 
socio-technical conditions impacting the expansion of a person’s capabilities to lead 
                                                        
1  See, e.g. AMARTYA K. SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (2000); Amartya Sen, Rights and Capabilities, in 
MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY: A TRIBUTE TO J. L. MACKIE 130–48 (Ted Honderich ed., 1985). 
2  See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 31-36 
(2011); Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (1997). 
3  For an overview, see Peter Vallentyne, Debate: Capabilities Versus Opportunities for Well-Being, 13 J. POL.  
PHIL. 359 (2005). 
4  Julie E. Cohen, Affording Fundamental Rights: A Provocation Inspired by Mireille Hildebrandt, 4 CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS LAW 78, 84 (2017). 
5  Id. at 87. 
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the life she desired.6 A general shortcoming of the existing rights discourse that 
Cohen identifies is related to the problem that almost all smart technologies are 
designed and controlled by the private sector while most legal regimes understand 
fundamental rights as a defense against state interference. Without developing this 
important argument any further she claims that a rights-conceived-as-affordances-
approach would be “an effective starting point” for an in-depth discussion of “the 
human rights obligations of private economic actors.”7 
Cohen’s approach has great merits as it reflects the practical effects of digital 
technologies as constraints and affordances of individual communication online and 
shows how both a rights-as-liberties-approach and a rights-as-capabilities-approach 
are unable to cope with some of the most pressing challenges of the digital reality. 
While in agreement with Cohen’s realism and her thesis that affordances must be 
taken seriously in the fundamental rights discourse, this Article responds to the 
identified practical challenges within a different conceptual framework that is 
grounded in Niklas Luhmann’s sociological systems theory. 
When formulated in the semantics of Luhmann’s theory, the history of 
fundamental rights development is not phrased in a language of discontinuities or 
ruptures, highlighting differences between rights conceived as liberties, capabilities 
or affordances. The focus of the theory is not on the form but on the function of 
fundamental rights, and an empirical perspective is as important as a normative one. 
Luhmann distinguishes between fundamental rights as institutions of the law and 
fundamental rights as institutions of society. As institutions of society they guarantee 
continuity in the protection of individual and social autonomies against all hazards 
that given social and technological conditions may entail regardless of eventualities 
in the evolution of society. With regard to fundamental rights as institutions of the law 
the question moves center-stage how society’s aim to promote and protect individual 
and social autonomies against digital challenges translates into the formal language 
of the law. 
Luhmann’s theorizing about society and the law is primarily descriptive. While 
the insights that may be gained from social science–informed observation and 
description of factual developments are indispensable for a thorough analysis of the 
law’s ends in the networked environment, such a perspective is methodologically 
challenging. The question is how the knowledge that is gained within the descriptive 
context of social science can afterwards be transferred to the realm of legal practice, 
which is where normative conclusions are drawn and performative effects result. 
Such problems have been reflected in a sub-discipline of legal science that has 
become known as Sociological Jurisprudence. Eugen Ehrlich and Roscoe Pound, the 
pioneers of Sociological Jurisprudence, suggested resolving the problem by 
conceiving the science of legal practice as a subdomain of sociology.8 However, this 
“solution” only mystifies the fundamental distinction between “is” and “ought” and 
might be the effect of the two pioneers’ infatuation with a paradox, the paradox of 
                                                        
6  See id. at 88. 
7  Id. at 89. 
8  See, e.g., EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 25 (Walter L. Moll trans., 
Transaction Publishers 2002) (1913); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 
HARV. L. REV. 591, 594 (1911). 
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Sociological Jurisprudence. 9  This paradox cannot be resolved but only unfolded 
through drawing a distinction between a sociological perspective and a legal 
perspective. Accordingly, Sociological Jurisprudence should be constructed as a two-
step method of socio-legal analysis. The first step involves an empiric observation 
and description of real legal problems from the perspective of social science and 
social theory. While this is necessary to fully understand the social dimension of the 
legal problems at issue, a second step must follow aimed at a re-import of the gained 
insights back into the legal system. This second step requires a change of perspective 
from describing social facts to prescribing normative ends. Hence, it is necessary to 
reformulate insights gained from sociological observations in the language of the law. 
This methodological premise must be kept in mind while reading this Article. 
Smart technologies require the law to re-think the relationship between 
materiality and sociality. To achieve this within a framework of sociological systems 
theory, a first step is to emphasize that smart technologies are materialities which 
embody constraints or values affording social behaviour. The main challenge of a 
systems theory approach is that materialities have not been in the foreground of 
Luhmann’s communication-centred framework. A key theoretical question is 
therefore how the relationship between materiality and sociality should be conceived 
within autopoiesis theory. 
This Article makes a case for a conceptualization of the Internet’s materiality 
within sociological systems theory that reflects the close interrelationship between 
the level of complexity of society’s current form of differentiation and the digital 
networked ecosystem. Part I applies the concept of affordances to the networked 
environment, illustrating through specific examples — such as the Twitter hashtag 
and ad-blocking technology — how affordances in the Internet are co-determined in 
dynamic, recursive processes of material design and social interpretation. Part II 
situates the concept of affordances within Luhmann’s theory of sociological systems. 
Part III describes how the Internet correlates with social organizations and 
institutions in creating complexity but also in providing strategies for managing that 
complexity. Building on these assumptions, Part IV discusses the implications for 
fundamental rights theory in general and the need to recognize a new fundamental 
freedom that specifically protects the Internet as an institution. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it aims at locating the 
Internet within sociological systems theory and second, it endeavours to show that 
from this perspective entirely new insights can be gained for fundamental rights 
theory in contemporary society. 
2. PART I: AFFORDANCES, SOCIETY AND THE NET 
“Affordance” is a term that lacks precise conceptual contours. It was coined by 
the perceptual psychologist James Gibson in 1979. 10  For Gibson, animals are 
equipped to perceive information in their environment selectively, in function of the 
                                                        
9  See Gunther Teubner, Nach den Fällen: Paradoxien soziologischer Jurisprudenz, in DIE FÄLLE DER GESELLSCHAFT 
227, 227 (Bertram Lomfeld ed., 2017). 
10  See JAMES J. GIBSON, THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VISUAL PERCEPTION (1979); see also Ian Hutchby, 
Technologies, Texts and Affordances, 35 SOCIOLOGY 441, 447 (2001). 
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information’s relevance for the animal’s survival. Within this scheme, the 
environment’s affordances (opportunities or invitations) are considered to be 
functionally relevant information for the living system.11 Ten years later the concept 
was appropriated and popularized by Donald Norman, a designer.12 According to 
Norman, the term “affordance” refers to the design aspects of an object, “primarily 
those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be 
used.”13 This definition suggests a deterministic approach to technology. The “design 
constituency”14 — that is, the designer, or group of designers, who creates an artefact 
— is considered to determine the range of the object’s potential uses. The possibility 
of flexibility in the user response to the original design options is not part of the 
equation. This definition spread widely in the relevant scholarship, although 
Norman later corrected some of the original version’s ambiguities. 15  Norman’s 
original definition is still methodologically useful as it uncovers the pitfalls of 
technological determinism.16 Contrary to Norman’s belief, the original design of a 
material object or technology does not determine its possible use, as affordances are 
“inherently multiple”.17 There is always flexibility — not only in the design of a 
technology but also in its reception. The flexibility in the design of a technology 
results from design constituencies being able to choose the politics/values that a 
certain technology embodies when it is created. But there is also flexibility in the way 
the “impact constituency”18 can interpret a technology. 
An example of this flexibility is the hashtag, which was suggested by Twitter’s 
impact constituency in 2007 as a means of structuring discourse on the 
microblogging platform.19 In a tweet from August 23, 2007, Chris Messina asked the 
Twitter community, “[H]ow do you feel about using # (pound) for groups. As in 
#barcamp [msg]?”20 This was the birth of the hashtag on Twitter, the “hash” being 
the # sign and the “tag” a specific keyword such as “netneutrality.” While the 
hashtag sign had been used before inter alia as an annotation referring to channels of 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC),21 the innovative element of Messina’s contribution was to 
                                                        
11  See Leah A. Lievrouw, The Materiality of Mediated Knowledge and Expression, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES 21, 48 
(Tarleton Gillespie et al. eds., 2014). 
12  See DONALD A. NORMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY THINGS (1988); see also Lievrouw, supra note 11, at 
48. 
13  NORMAN, supra note 12, at 8. 
14  Bryan Pfaffenberger, Technological Dramas, 17 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 282, 283 (1992). 
15  See Donald A. Norman, Affordance, Conventions, and Design, 6 INTERACTIONS 38, 42 (1999); see also Joanna 
McGrenere & Wayne Ho, Affordances: Clarifying and Evolving a Concept, in PROCEEDINGS OF GRAPHICS 
INTERFACE 2000, at 179, 184 (2000). McGrenere and Ho consider the wide spread of Norman’s flawed 
original definition to be the primary reason why many versions of the concept’s definition proliferated and 
why the concept lacks clarity today. 
16  See Lievrouw, supra note 11, at 27. 
17  Pfaffenberger, supra note 14, at 284. 
18  Id. at 296. 
19  See Alex Leavitt, From #FollowFriday to YOLO: Exploring the Cultural Salience of Twitter Memes, in TWITTER 
AND SOCIETY 137, 137 (Katrin Weller et al. eds., 2014). 
20  Chris Messina (@chrismessina), TWITTER (Aug. 23, 2007, 12:25 PM), https://twitter.com/chrismessina/status/ 
223115412. 
21  See Liz Gannes, The Short and Illustrious History of Twitter #Hashtags, GIGAOM (Apr. 30, 2010), https://gigaom. 
com/2010/04/30/the-short-and-illustrious-history-of-twitter-hashtags/. 
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convince the Twitter community of its usefulness as a means of indexing microblogs 
and grouping conversations.22 Adding the hashtag #netneutrality to a tweet allows 
the marking and contextualizing of communication through metadata that relates the 
post to a new or ongoing Twitter-discussion about net neutrality. 23  Messina 
described the advantage of the hashtag as representing “a solid convention for 
coordinating ad-hoc groupings and giving people a way to organize their 
communications in a way that the tool (Twitter) does not currently afford.”24 The 
hashtag’s innovation consisted in the possibility of structuring a conversation on 
Twitter without the need to follow a particular twitterer. This is an example of user 
innovation that greatly improved Twitter’s significance for public communication 
and which was later officially incorporated into the platform’s architecture by 
Twitter Inc.25 It demonstrates how an impact constituency may be able to respond to 
a technology’s affordances. Although things have prescriptive capacities26 enlisting 
users into a certain role, they do not have innate regulatory aims. Rather than having 
built-in agency (or politics27), there is plasticity in the design of material things.28 
Artefacts, including technologies of the Internet, are shaped by accompanying 
interpretations in a discursive process that Bryan Pfaffenberger calls “technological 
drama.”29 
The technological drama is a theory describing “a discourse of technological 
‘statements’ and ‘counterstatements’” 30  that is supposed to explain interactions 
between the social and the material when technologies are designed and received by 
different constituencies. The drama reconstructs the design and reception of an 
artefact as recursive interactions between materiality and sociality. According to 
Pfaffenberger, “the reciprocal construction of political aims and artifacts” is “coupled 
with the deliberate fabrication of controlled social contexts.”31 As ideal-types, three 
processes or acts can be distinguished in a technological drama, including 
technological regularization, technological adjustment and technological 
reconstitution. The drama starts with technological regularization — that is, the 
creation of a technological artefact by the design constituency. The newly designed 
artefact has no meaning until it is interpreted by the design constituency in a 
discursive process. At this stage, meaning is implanted into the artefact in such a way 
                                                        
22  See Alexander Halavais, Structure on Twitter: Social and Technical, in TWITTER AND SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 
29, 36. 
23  See also Axel Bruns & Jean E. Burgess, The Use of Twitter Hashtags in the Formation of Ad Hoc Publics, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH (ECPR) GENERAL CONFERENCE 
2011 (2011), http://eprints.qut.edu.au/46515/. 
24  Chris Messina, Twitter Hashtags for Emergency Coordination and Disaster Relief, FACTORY JOE (Oct. 22, 2007), 
https://factoryjoe.com/2007/10/22/twitter-hashtags-for-emergency-coordination-and-disaster-relief/. 
25  See also Bruns & Burgess, supra note 23, at 2. 
26  See Bruno Latour, Where are the Missing Masses?: The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artefacts, in SHAPING 
TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY 225, 232–40 (Wiebe E. Bijker & John Law eds., 1992). 
27  See Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121 (1980). 
28  See Trevor J. Pinch & Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or How the Sociology of 
Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 17 (Wiebe E. Bijker et al. eds., 1987). 
29  Pfaffenberger, supra note 14. 
30  Id. at 285. 
31  Id. at 291. 
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that some of its technical features embody a political aim.32 This is the process that 
Pfaffenberger describes as the establishment of a cultural mythos that is a dominant 
view in society about what a certain technology is and what it can do. Through the 
establishment of the mythos, the design constituency tries to define alternative 
interpretations away. 33  Irrespective of the design constituency’s efforts to take 
“logonomic control”34 of the artefact’s social context, ambiguities will always subsist.  
Remaining ambiguities can be exploited by the impact constituency in the second 
act of “technological adjustment.” At this stage the impact constituency constructs 
alternative interpretations and tries to establish a “countermythos” of what the 
technology is or can do. The call to use the hashtag on Twitter for the purpose of 
discourse structuring is an example illustrating a process of technological adjustment. 
While such a process does not involve a change in the technology, the ensuing stage 
of technological reconstitution consists of a material redesign of the technology 
through the impact constituency. 
Regarding reconstitution, the drama’s third act, an example is the emergence of 
technology allowing users to block advertisements on the websites they visit.35 Ad-
blocking technology was created as a “counterartefact” 36  with the purpose of 
technically reconstituting the functionality of behaviour-tracking cookies. According 
to Helen Nissenbaum, the advertising industry’s lobbying backed the introduction of 
the so-called “third-party” cookie by decision RFC 2965 of the Internet Engineering 
Task Force in 1997.37 The “third-party” cookie turned out to be particularly invasive 
on people’s privacy as it allows websites to follow people even when they visit new 
websites. Ad-blocking technology can be seen as a technical answer to “third-party” 
cookies. While Adblock Plus, a creation of Eyeo, an Internet company, is the most 
widely used ad-blocker, many other companies are also producing such software. 
The meaning and value of the counterartefact, however, does not come from such 
companies but from those who are negatively affected by the original technology — 
in the case of ad-blocking, the myriad of users who feel annoyed by intrusive online-
advertisements.  
Pfaffenberger shows that the fabrication of a counterartefact can sometimes shift 
from technological reconstitution to regularization, the first act of a new 
technological drama. Evidence for this is again the ad-blocking case. As ad-blocking 
makes online publishers lose money, several such companies, including Axel 
Springer, Spiegel online and Süddeutsche Zeitung sued Eyeo in the German courts. 
In what can be seen as a (new) act of technological adjustment, Eyeo then offered a 
compromise, authorizing net publishers who were willing to pay Eyeo six percent of 
their revenues, to integrate a tag on their websites that let selected ads show up.38 
Hence the technology changed from blocking any advertising to selecting ads that — 
                                                        
32  See id. 
33  See id. at 295. 
34  Id. at 296. 
35  Online Advertising: Block Shock: Internet Users Are Increasingly Blocking Ads, Including on Their Mobiles, 
ECONOMIST (June 6, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21653644-internet-users-are-
increasingly-blocking-ads-including-their-mobiles-block-shock. 
36  Pfaffenberger, supra note 14, at 304. 
37  See Helen Nissenbaum, From Preemption to Circumvention: If Technology Regulates, Why Do We Need 
Regulation (and Vice Versa)?, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1367, 1382 (2011). 
38  See ‚Adblock Plus‘-Macher reichen Medienhäusern die Hand, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG (Sept. 14, 2016). 
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for whatever reason — were not considered as bad. Eyeo for their part were busy 
explaining this move through the creation of a countermyth of their software arguing 
that:  
 
“[W]e have learned that most users wouldn’t mind seeing better, more 
informative ads. In fact, the majority of people we’ve talked to are keenly aware that 
advertising plays a pivotal role in keeping content online free. Trouble is, most 
Internet ads are still low on quality and high on annoyance, and the two sides – users 
and advertisers – rarely come together. That’s where we come in. We find ourselves 
uniquely positioned to broker a compromise that makes the Internet better for all 
parties. We aim to make the entire ecosystem more sustainable by encouraging true 
innovation and non-intrusive ad standards, on the one end, and a better user 
experience on the other.”39 
 
The countermythos that Eyeo was suggesting focuses on a trade-off between 
information and annoyance. The success of this suggestion is, however, doubtful as it 
is easy to see that Eyeo is a company that wants to make money, and the introduction 
of whitelists is essential to secure their business model. It is no surprise therefore that 
the drama continues and the suggested mythos is rejected by websites which are not 
willing to pay a fee. While some websites develop software that blocks users who 
block their ads, others ask their audience to voluntarily accept ads as a contribution 
to high-quality news reporting.40  
For Pfaffenberger “the drama can drop out of the technology.”41 This would be a 
stage of “designification” 42  which can be reached when, because of unforeseen 
technological or social reasons, the recursively intertwined dynamics come to an end. 
For Nissenbaum this would be a dangerous stage because people would then be 
“inclined to accept that technology is neutral” and “forget that there are values or 
politics involved in technology at all.”43 
Pfaffenberger’s theory thus paves the way to a conceptualization of affordances 
that avoids technological determinism. On the other hand, the concept of affordance 
stands clear from a social constructivist perspective claiming “that technological 
artefacts, in both their form and their meaning, are socially shaped, as opposed to 
being the clearly defined products of particular inventors or innovators.”44 Rather, 
affordances of technology are conceived to be co-determined in recursive practices of 
material design and social interpretation.45 The question to discuss in Part II is how 
the concept of affordance fits with Luhmann’s sociological systems theory. 
                                                        
39  See EYEO: OUR MISSION, https://eyeo.com/ (last visited November 2, 2017). 
40  See ECONOMIST, supra note 35. 
41  Pfaffenberger, supra note 14, at 308. 
42  Id. 
43  Nissenbaum, supra note 37, at 1379. 
44  Hutchby, supra note 10, at 441. 
45  For a similar view, see Lievrouw, supra note 11, at 48. 
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3. PART II: LUHMANN’S SYSTEMS THEORY AND THE 
INTERNET 
Niklas Luhmann’s sociological systems theory provides one of the most 
sophisticated analyses of contemporary society and its legal system. Because of the 
strong focus on the social and the marginalisation of the material that is characteristic 
of Luhmann’s writings the question is how autopoiesis theory is able to cope with 
the challenges that technological affordances pose for social and legal theorizing.  
For Luhmann, society is an autopoietic system — that is, a system reproducing its 
elements autonomously out of its own elements.46 The elements of a social system are 
communications and not humans or actions of humans or other agents.47 This does 
not mean that autopoiesis theory is de-humanized, as some of Luhmann’s critics 
have claimed,48 but rather that humans are not a system. For Luhmann, a human 
being is a structural coupling of phenomenologically different systems. Her body is a 
biological system, her consciousness a psychic system and human communications 
are components of the social system.49 Communicative interactions between people 
are conceived by Luhmann as a structural coupling of psychic systems, providing for 
a situation of co-evolution through mutual observation. Any selection in a 
communicative process (as discussed below) is contingent. Since at least two 
processors of communication must be involved in any interaction there is double 
contingency.50 The consequence of this is that communication in interaction systems 
cannot be conceived as a simple transmission of information between two parties.51 
Interactions are closed systems in the sense that the communication between the 
involved people can only be understood within the context of the system; a stranger 
approaching an ongoing interaction would need some introduction to its “history” in 
order to be able to participate.52 
3.1 WHAT IS COMMUNICATION? 
For Luhmann, communication is the only genuinely social operation.53 It is not 
humans who communicate, only communications can communicate. Communication 
is not a “speech act”54 and it is not produced by language — he explicitly rejects 
structuralist assumptions. 55  Luhmann defines communication as the synthesis of 
three selections: the selection of “utterance,” the selection of “information,” and the 
                                                        
46  See NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS 37 (John Bednarz & Dirk Baecker trans., 1995) (1984). 
47  See Hugh Baxter, Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Autopoietic Legal Systems, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 167, 176 
(2013); see also HANS-GEORG MOELLER, THE RADICAL LUHMANN 19–24 (2012) (providing a more detailed 
analysis of Luhmann’s theory). 
48  See, e.g., OLIVER LEPSIUS, STEUERUNGSDISKUSSION, SYSTEMTHEORIE UND PARLAMENTARISMUSKRITIK (1999); 
MATTHIAS MAHLMANN, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE 241 (4th ed. 2017). 
49  See MOELLER, supra note 47, at 23. 
50  See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 46, at ch. 2. 
51  See Niklas Luhmann, The Form of Writing, 9 STAN. LITERATURE REV. 25, 27 (1992). 
52  See Niklas Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, in SOCIOCYBERNETIC PARADOXES 172, 177 (R. F. Geyer 
& J. van der Zouwen eds., 1986). 
53  See 1 NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY 42 (Rhodes Barrett trans., 2012) (1997). 
54  Luhmann, The Form of Writing, supra note 51, at 27. 
55  See Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, supra note 52, at 174. 
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selection of “understanding.” 56  In a communication process, the distinctions of 
utterance and information of the first communication are understood by the second 
one. While an utterance is an act of expression, information refers to the distinction 
between the act and its content and can be explained as a difference between 
medium and form.57 Luhmann uses the word “medium” in this context to describe 
something that we normally call “substance.”58 A medium stands for something 
loosely coupled and needs to be distinguished from a form, which is a substance 
with more strongly coupled elements.59 Thus, form can always be the medium for 
something else that is becoming form. The light of a candle, for example, is a medium 
that becomes form when it shines through the lenses and painted slides of a Magic 
Lantern and is projected onto a wall. Information is an utterance that has gained 
form. The selection of information in the first communication involves a decision 
about the meaning of the selected utterance. Hence, information does not pre-exist as 
a completed unit in the world but is internally constructed in a communicative 
process as a result of a selection. The third selection, understanding, is the synthesis 
of the previous two selections and involves the re-entry of the form into another form. 
Understanding occurs in the second communication when the distinction between 
utterance and information of the first communication is put into a new form, itself 
involving a distinction between utterance and information. Communication thus 
happens in social systems as the understanding distinction between utterance and 
information.60 In other words, when a first communication expresses something, this 
involves two selections about utterance and information and the second 
communication’s understanding is the third selection.61 Hence, understanding is an 
internal process, which is the result of the application of a social system’s own 
criteria for selection. There is no input or output of components into the social system 
or transfer of information, as many communication theories suggest.62 
3.2 TYPES OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
Interactions and society are different types of social systems. People 
communicate in interaction systems and their communications must take account of 
their communicative environment. 63 Societies however cannot communicate with 
their environment since that would presuppose the inclusion of the “understanding 
partner in the system.” 64  The existence of a sub-system of society implies a 
distinction between the system and its environment that is based on communicative 
characteristics. For Luhmann, the distinction between system and environment is a 
                                                        
56  Id. at 175. 
57  See LARS QVORTRUP, THE HYPERCOMPLEX SOCIETY 143 (2003). 
58  See id. at 111. 
59  See Luhmann, The Form of Writing, supra note 51, at 31. 
60  See Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, supra note 52, at 183. 
61  See QVORTRUP, supra note 57, at 143. 
62  For a reconstruction of four main models of communication that are based on the sender/medium/receiver-
differentiation, see id. at 126–32. 
63  See Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, supra note 52, at 177. 
64  Id. at 176. 
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form with two sides that are intrinsically bound up with each other.65 Every system 
constitutes itself according to one specific difference and everything that is not part 
of the system is in the environment. Systems are operatively closed, which implies 
that for their reproduction they just monitor their own operations and exclude 
everything else. Within society, a number of sub-systems have become differentiated. 
They differ from each other in the specific function that they fulfil within society. 
Some of the most important systems that Luhmann distinguishes in his writings 
include the law, politics, the economy, science, art, religion, education, mass media 
and family.  
It is not only humans and brains but also material objects that are excluded from 
society.66 This is one of the reasons why Luhmann’s theory has been accused by the 
German media theorist Friedrich Kittler and some of his sympathizers of being 
“technologically blind.” 67  Although Luhmann argues that neither brains nor 
machines communicate, he specifies that computers enable the production of 
structural couplings between consciousness and communication.68 To understand 
how computers and the Internet are important for communication and the social 
system, it is necessary to recall that Luhmann distinguishes three types of media: 1) 
language, 2) symbolically generalized communication media (success media) and 3) 
distribution media.69 Meaning is the most important success medium of society, and 
both psychic systems and communicative systems use meaning for their own 
reproduction. In the sense of the media/form dichotomy, social systems use meaning 
as a form for the production of communications. Computers, for their part, do not 
belong to the sphere of communication — they are machines, Luhmann’s fourth 
category of systems. 70  The (networked) computer is a distribution medium. 71 
Consequently, a network of computers serves as a distribution medium in a similar 
way that the printing press, telegraph, telephone or broadcasting media have been 
crucial means for the distribution of meaning.  
3.3 PARTICULARITY OF THE INTERNET 
The particularity of the Internet is that it couples the functions of a distribution 
medium with those of a success medium, constituting a morphologically hybrid 
network of material things and communication. The material sphere and the sphere 
of communication are integrated into one communicative structure and both spheres 
                                                        
65  See Baxter, supra note 47, at 176. 
66  See NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 67 (Klaus Alex Ziegert trans., 2004) (1993); LUHMANN, 
THEORY OF SOCIETY, supra note 53, at 28. 
67  See, e.g., Vagias Karavas, The Force of Code: Law's Transformation under Information-Technological Conditions, 
10 GERMAN L.J. 463 (2009); Geoffrey Winthrop-Young & Nicholas Gane, Friedrich Kittler: An Introduction, 23 
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 5 (2006); Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, Silicon Sociology, or, Two Kings on Hegel's 
Throne?: Kittler, Luhmann, and the Posthuman Merger of German Media Theory, 13 YALE J. CRITICISM 391, 409 
(2000). 
68  See LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, supra note 53, at 65–66. 
69  See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 46, at 160–61; LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, supra note 53, at 
120–23. 
70  See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 46, at 2. 
71  See Dirk Baecker, Niklas Luhmann in the Society of the Computer, 13 CYBERNETICS & HUM. KNOWING 25, 29 
(2006). 
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interact with each other without either part being able to determine the other. It is 
exactly here where the theory of affordances, developed in Part I, can be connected 
with sociological systems theory. The technology of the Internet affords certain uses 
that in turn impact on the communications that are taking place over the network of 
computers. 
Accordingly, the Internet is not a social system72 and it does not directly produce 
meaning. Rather, by the networking of computers, the Internet materially designs the 
continuous linking up of communicative events.73 For Luhmann, events are created 
by a social system and not, for example, by the physical environment or human or 
artificial agents. Events exist only for a limited time span — they “vanish soon after 
they appear.”74 Their duration is a matter of definition and will depend on decisions 
taken by the autopoietic system itself. While events belong to the social realm it is the 
electronic actions of the material network that afford events to follow upon events. 
Hence the Internet is co-determined by the social and the material to build structures 
constituting a hybrid network of events that reproduces itself. 75 Events not only 
distinguish between system and environment but also connect a system with a 
concrete situation, and the distinction between event and situation allows a system 
or other observer to “see the difference between system and environment as the 
structure of the situation.”76 
If events are recursively used to produce new events and the new event must be 
different from the previous one, how then do social systems maintain themselves? As 
seen, structures of social systems are dynamic in the sense that they are built on 
events dying soon after appearance. Although events cannot be protected against 
dissolution, their structure-generating power can be preserved by memory, script, 
printing press or other distribution media such as the Internet. 77  The material 
affordances of text as a mechanical storage medium differ from those of a computer 
hard disk inasmuch as the latter requires digital code as an intermediary to make the 
stored information readable at all.78 Computer code affords interweaving of sound, 
language, script, printed text, still or moving images, and combinations of everything. 
Combined with the read/write interfaces of Web 2.0, 79  this leads to a 
hyperconnectivity that highly exceeds the complexity of text. 80  While external 
patterns can be helpful for the social system’s maintenance, Luhmann insists that 
these patterns are not produced by the social system — the purpose of the social 
system is to produce events.81 
                                                        
72  For a contrary view, see Peter Bøgh Anderson, WWW as Self-Organizing System, 5 CYBERNETICS & HUM. 
KNOWING 5 (1998). 
73  See Christoph B. Graber, Bottom-up Constitutionalism: The Case of Net Neutrality, 7 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL 
THEORY 524 (2017); see also DAN WIELSCH, ZUGANGSREGELN: DIE RECHTSVERFASSUNG DER WISSENSTEILUNG 
236–38 (2008). 
74  QVORTRUP, supra note 57, at 168. 
75  See Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, supra note 52, at 174. 
76  Id. at 181. 
77  See id. at 180. 
78  See 4 THOMAS VESTING, COMPUTERNETZWERKE, DIE MEDIEN DES RECHTS 54 (2015). 
79  For a definition, see infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
80  See id. at 53; see also INT’L PANEL ON SOC. PROGRESS, CHAPTER 13: MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS 27 (2016), 
https://comment.ipsp.org/chapter/chapter-13-media-and-communications. 
81  See Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, supra note 52, at 181. 
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3.4 HYPERCOMPLEXITY 
According to Luhmann, we live in a hypercomplex society — that is, a society 
which is based on second order observation. In Theory of Society, his magnum opus, 
he explains that hypercomplex systems arise when one observer describes another 
observer’s description of society.82 While early modern society stands out as a social 
structure that is governed through anthropozentric rationality, contemporary society 
is functionally differentiated in many systems with different rationalities in a 
polycontextural world.83 The rationality of a system is embedded in its binary code 
and one specific binary code is at the basis of every social system. While the law, for 
example, observes itself in its environment through the distinction between legal and 
illegal, the political code juxtaposes the values of power and not power and the 
economy operates a code distinguishing between necessary and unnecessary 
payments, and so forth. As there are many system rationalities, there is no 
Archimedean vantage point from where social complexity in its entirety could be 
observed. Modern anthropocentrism has been replaced by polycentrism in the 
hypercomplex society.84 Since each system is an observer permanently observing 
other observers in its environment, which are themselves observing systems, the 
complexity is overwhelming. In addition, Luhmann refers to the “temporalisation of 
complexity.” 85 Under conditions of technology-enhanced social acceleration, 
complexity is not only to be considered in the dimension of space but also in the 
dimension of time.86 In a high-speed society, the contraction of time-horizons makes 
it more challenging to make informed decisions.87 All in all, there is an urgent need 
for contemporary society to develop adequate strategies for complexity management.  
3.5 COMPLEXITY MANAGEMENT 
Formal organizations and institutions serve the purpose of complexity reduction 
in society. According to Luhmann, (formal) organizations and institutions are means 
that social systems develop for their internal differentiation. A formal organization 
— a third type of social system to be distinguished besides interactions and 
societies88 — is a social system that places itself between society and the individual 
interaction system.89 A formally organized system is based on membership, which is 
self-referentially coupled with certain entry conditions.90 Specific success media — 
such as property and political power — act as catalysts for building systems in the 
                                                        
82  See LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, supra note 53, at 80; 2 NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY 173, 183 
(Rhodes Barrett trans., 2013) (1997); see also LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 46, at 471. 
83  See NIKLAS LUHMANN, OBSERVATIONS ON MODERNITY (William Whobrey trans., 1998). 
84  See QVORTRUP, supra note 57, at 6–7. 
85  Niklas Luhmann, Temporalization of Complexity, in SOCIOCYBERNETICS: AN ACTOR-ORIENTED SOCIAL 
SYSTEMS APPROACH 95 (R. F. Geyer & Johannes van der Zouwen eds., 1978). 
86  See Riccardo Prandini, The Future of Societal Constitutionalism in the Age of Acceleration, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 731 (2013). 
87  See id. at 754. 
88  See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 46, at 2, 15. 
89  See 2 NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLÄRUNG 13–14 (1975). 
90  See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 46, at 196–97. 
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form of organizations.91 The point is that expectations of the organization can vary 
independently of those of its members. Under conditions of double contingency and 
acceleration, rules of membership thus allow for sustainably reproducing highly 
artificial expectations.92 Institutions are a second solution for complexity reduction 
that society has developed. An institution is a set of behavioural expectations that 
can count on social consensus. 93  Institutions become meaningful when people 
interpret their roles in society. They are thus an important element not only for 
coordination in the interaction system and in society but also for channelling 
expectations and thus complexity reduction. Fundamental rights are an example of 
an institution of the legal system. Fundamental rights bundle normative expectations 
that are related to the protection of individual and social autonomies.  
Although there are no direct connections, the Internet is interrelated with the 
level of complexity of society’s current form of differentiation. Arguably there is a 
parallelism in the organizational structure between society and the Internet. The 
thesis is that the Internet represents strategies for complexity management that are 
analogous in their function to formal organizations and institutions. Part III 
elaborates on this thesis and the problems related to the Internet’s complexity 
management strategies. 
4. PART III: THE MATERIALITY OF THE NET AND THE 
STRUCTURE-GENERATING POWER OF COMMUNICATIVE 
EVENTS 
Based on Luhmann, Lars Qvortrup claims that the Internet has become the 
dominant distribution medium because it is the only such medium that fits the needs 
of a hypercomplex society. 94  Arguably there are two reasons for this. First, the 
Internet is the distribution medium which is best equipped for complexity 
management under conditions of double contingency. Second, the Internet promises 
global reach, which is essential for a society that has, according to Luhmann, become 
a world society. 95  We have seen that the development towards Web 2.0 96 
functionality allows these two points to appear to be inherently linked.97 Indeed, 
network hyperconnectivity gives complexity an additional boost and makes it even 
more urgent to develop strategies to reduce it. On the other hand, the viability of 
such strategies now increasingly depends on a few transnational platform 
corporations (including Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon), each of them 
globally occupying dominant market positions. 98 As designers of artificially 
                                                        
91  NIKLAS LUHMANN, MACHT 99 (1975). 
92  See LUHMANN, SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLÄRUNG, supra note 89, at 14. 
93  See NIKLAS LUHMANN, GRUNDRECHTE ALS INSTITUTION 12–13 (1965). 
94  See QVORTRUP, supra note 57, at 169. 
95  See Niklas Luhmann, Globalization or World Society: How to Conceive of Modern Society?, 7 INT’L REV. SOC. 67 
(1997). 
96  For a definition see infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
97  See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
98  See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133. 
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intelligent algorithms, operators of the Internet’s essential information networks and 
colonizers of the Big Data space, they possess pervasive regulatory power.99 
To valuate Qvortrup’s thesis about the Internet’s complexity management 
function within autopoiesis theory we have to return to Luhmann’s concept of 
communication as the synthesis of the selections of utterance, information and 
understanding. In order to understand the Internet’s communicative impact as a 
distribution medium, the distinction between the selections of information and 
understanding is paramount. As no communication is able to observe the other’s 
selection of understanding, communication processes are characterized by double 
contingency. The only thing that a second communication can observe is the first 
communication’s selections of utterance/information and vice versa. 100  The 
modalities of this selection depend on technology. The question to focus on in the 
following sections is how the management of communicative complexity interrelates 
with the technical particularities of a society’s dominant distribution medium.   
4.1 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DISTRIBUTION MEDIA AND 
SOCIAL COMPLEXITY 
From a historical perspective it is possible to identify correlations between types 
of social organization and types of distribution media. In a segmented society, which 
is based on oral communication, memory is the dominant distribution medium. 
Memory serves the purposes of small-scale societies well where communication 
takes place face to face between people that are connected in time and space.101 
In everyday language and mainstream academic literature, communication is 
attributed to persons and individual actions. For methodological reasons it is thus 
necessary to clarify how references to individual actions are conceived in Luhmann’s 
theory. While we have seen that it is only social systems that communicate, the 
operation of the communication can be distinguished from the observation of the 
communication at a second level. In interaction systems, for example, it is possible at 
the second level to observe the operation of a structural coupling between the 
consciousnesses of the psychic systems and the living bodies of those participating in 
the communication.102 Accordingly, actions of participants in the communication are 
the result of a reconstruction of the communication at level of observation and its 
attribution to persons. The concept of person, then again, does not refer to human 
beings in their quality as psychic or organic systems but to points of communicative 
identification that are internally created by the social system. Persons are thus 
communicative artefacts. Actions of persons are constituted through attribution and 
are the result of observations and descriptions within social systems.103 
If we thus observe a face-to-face communication between persons A and B, the 
only trace of their interaction will be in their memories. We see that B observes A’s 
                                                        
99  See INT’L PANEL ON SOC. PROGRESS, supra note 80, at 31; FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE 
SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public 
Domain: The Legal Construction of the Surveillance Economy, PHIL. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017). 
100  See QVORTRUP, supra note 57, at 169. 
101  See 1 THOMAS VESTING, SPRACHE, DIE MEDIEN DES RECHTS 81–118 (2011). 
102  See LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, supra note 53, at 227. 
103  See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 46, at 165–66. 
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utterance/information selection and understands it in a certain way. Whether B’s 
understanding corresponds with A’s communication is likely to show in B’s next 
communication through statements of confirmation or correction. Mnemonic 
techniques (such as singing and storytelling in Aboriginal Australia104) enable the 
tradition of information being passed from generation to generation and thus 
contributing to cultural “storage” in the collective memory. 105 The innovation of 
script then provided for an externalized memory106 and permitted discontinuities in 
time and space.107 Script allowed communication between people who were remote 
from each other but — in the case of shipping letters, for example — made the 
correction of errors more time-consuming than oral communication.  
It was only with the spread of the printing press in the fifteenth century that a 
more complex form of social organization became possible, which was based on 
functional differentiation. From a historical perspective, the emergence of the 
printing press played a key role in the transformation from segmented or stratified 
forms of social organization to functional differentiation. Luhmann, though, insists 
that the relationship between distribution media and symbolically generalized 
communication media is not a unilaterally deterministic one but rather one of mutual 
interdependencies.108 
4.2 AFFORDANCES, COMMUNICATIVE SELECTIONS AND SMART 
TECHNOLOGIES 
The question is, generally, how material affordances of distribution media affect 
“understanding control” — that is, the mutual verification of interpretations between 
sender and receiver.109 The printing press afforded the author of a newspaper article 
or book the opportunity to reach out to potentially large audiences although the 
selections of information and understanding were decoupled, and responses from 
the receiver were rather unlikely. Elizabeth Eisenstein showed in The Printing 
Revolution in Early Modern Europe that the mechanical reproduction of multiple copies 
and the availability of large quantities of printed materials at a relatively low price 
required the development of complexity-reduction strategies — including 
rationalization and systematization — as a response to an excess of information.110 
The spread of the printing press also had a great impact on society at large as it was a 
precondition for functional differentiation. In the legal system, for example, it was a 
                                                        
104  See RONALD M. BERNDT & CATHERINE H. BERNDT, THE SPEAKING LAND: MYTH AND STORY IN ABORIGINAL 
AUSTRALIA (1994); BRUCE CHATWIN, THE SONGLINES (1998); JILL STUBINGTON, SINGING THE LAND: THE 
POWER OF PERFORMANCE IN ABORIGINAL LIFE (2007). 
105  See MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW 175 (2015). 
106  See JAN ASSMANN, CULTURAL MEMORY AND EARLY CIVILIZATION (Henry Wilson trans., 2011) (1992); see also 
2 THOMAS VESTING, SCHRIFT, DIE MEDIEN DES RECHTS 49–88 (2011). 
107  See Luhmann, The Form of Writing, supra note 51, at 25–42, 29, 40. 
108  See LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, supra note 53, at 193–94. 
109  See QVORTRUP, supra note 57, at 172. 
110  See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (2d ed. 2005); see also 
MICHAEL GIESECKE, DER BUCHDRUCK IN DER FRÜHEN NEUZEIT (1991); 3 THOMAS VESTING, BUCHDRUCK, DIE 
MEDIEN DES RECHTS (2013); Anne Blair, Reading Strategies for Coping with Information Overload ca. 1550-1700, 
64 J. HIST. IDEAS 11 (2003). 
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factor accelerating the codification of private law111 as well as the appearance of 
written constitutions112 in Western Europe, and the development of a commercial 
value for books generated the need for copyright protection in the form of a statute 
— replacing the old system of printing privileges that mainly served the monarch’s 
censorship purposes.113 
As Qvortrup observes, the distribution media that emerged in the twentieth 
century (such as radio and TV broadcasting, the telephone, and the Internet) are all 
characterized by a physically decoupled relationship between the selections of 
information and understanding.114 However, in communicative interactions over the 
Internet, the physical decoupling between receiver and sender is not experienced as 
such. Indeed, online communication over cross-platform messaging applications and 
social media or interactions with search-engines and so forth seem to dissolve space-
time distinctions.  
Marshall McLuhan emphasized the differences in terms of synchronization 
between the printing press and electronic media. While the printing press afforded 
sequentiality in the communication process, electronic media generated simultaneity 
and configuration. 115 Drawing on McLuhan, Mireille Hildebrandt argues that 
simultaneous rather than sequential synchronization of “messages sent from 
different space-time configurations” is typical for the Web 1.0 (discrete websites 
linked through hypertext and accessed only via desktop or laptop computers) and 
the Web 2.0 (interactive online platforms accessible via multiple devices).116  
The networking of general purpose computers has not only afforded real-time 
remote communication but also the possibility for the platform to make decisions 
and establish control mechanisms “based on unprecedented predictive analyses and 
the simulation of highly complex processes.”117 In the era of the printing press our 
capability to predict the communications or actions of other agents was partially 
enabled by text.118 In the age of the Internet, predictive algorithms that are connected 
with the Big Data space no longer depend on text as an externalized memory. Rather, 
operations are becoming recursive to the extent that they are using machine learning 
(ML) techniques “that persistently nourish [themselves] on and reconfigure the 
timespace of Big Data.”119 Although in the age of the printing press, access to texts 
was often dependent on a reader’s wealth, class affiliation or location, institutions 
such as public libraries eventually provided for centralized access points to many 
                                                        
111  See HILDEBRANDT, supra note 105, at 178–79. 
112  See VESTING, supra note 110, at 115. 
113  See PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 127 (1996); Christoph B. Graber & Jessica C. 
Lai, Intellectual Property: Law in Context, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES 266, 266 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
114  See QVORTRUP, supra note 57, at 172–73. 
115  See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 12–13 (MIT Press 1994) 
(1964). 
116  HILDEBRANDT, supra note 105, at 50; see also INT’L PANEL ON SOC. PROGRESS, supra note 80, at 27. 
117  HILDEBRANDT, supra note 105, at 109. 
118  See id. at 58. 
119  Mireille Hildebrandt, Location Data, Purpose Binding and Contextual Integrity: What’s the Message?, in 
PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY — A NEW EQUILIBRIUM? 31, 35–36 (Luciano 
Floridi ed., 2014). 
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relevant publications. 120 While ML technologies afford unprecedented complexity 
management, these technologies are unequally distributed within society. ML 
technologies are expensive to develop as they depend on the availability of large 
amounts of training data, which are concentrated in the hands of giant platform 
corporations such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and others.  
The affordances of Internet-based smart technologies entail asymmetric opacity 
in the communication process between platform and user. While ML and Big Data 
afford a platform to predict and influence a user’s selection of understanding, the 
user will often not be aware that a profile has been applied to him. According to 
Hildebrandt, “[s]mart technologies are capable of anticipating us and of acting upon 
that, to test the accuracy of their anticipation.”121 It is nothing new that artefacts 
represent or embody social relations,122 but the combination of computer systems 
that pre-empt our intent and ML-supported personalization technologies afford 
platform corporations with unprecedented power to discriminate and manipulate 
users without their knowing. 123 Responses from the impact constituency become 
unlikely because the platforms monopolize the Big Data space with the effect that 
information that would be necessary for training algorithms (as counterartefacts) is 
enclosed in private silos rather than circulating freely for the benefit of society at 
large. The danger is “designification”, as the technological drama drops out of smart 
technologies. 
5. PART IV: CONSEQUENCES FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
THEORY AND FREEDOM OF THE INTERNET 
5.1 LUHMANN’S THEORY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Luhmann’s major work on fundamental rights is Grundrechte als Institution 
(Fundamental Rights as an Institution),124 a 1965 book that has — irrespective of its 
huge impact on constitutional rights theory in both the social sciences and the law — 
so far not been translated into English. Although fundamental rights are covered by 
Luhmann’s later monographs on the legal system,125 Grundrechte als Institution is 
the only separate study on the topic. The book’s main thesis is that fundamental 
rights are institutions of society that have emerged as a result of an evolutionary 
process of modernization with the function of protecting functional differentiation 
against society’s self-destructing tendencies. Fundamental rights are thus conceived 
as historically contingent social institutions that are related to society’s dominant 
structure of functional differentiation. As already discussed, in the process of 
functional differentiation autonomous spheres of meaning (or discourses) with their 
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own symbolically generalized communication media (such as money, scientific truth, 
law, power, faith and so forth) have emerged. Fundamental rights protect society’s 
own form of social organization against the dangers of de-differentiation, which can 
result — as Graber and Teubner argue — not only from the state but from any 
expanding social system. 126 Accordingly, they protect the autonomy of social 
discourses against the ever present self-destructive tendencies within society, 
emanating from totalizing social systems.127 While the state (as the self-description of 
the political system) has historically been the primary culprit, today the systems of 
science, economy and religion also display expansionist tendencies.  
This is obviously the point where Luhmann’s theory undertakes a change of 
perspective from a mere description of empirical facts to prescribing a normative aim: 
the protection of functional differentiation. With regard to the question of how we 
can know what the “best of all possible worlds” would be, Luhmann would certainly 
have more sympathy with Voltaire’s Candide than with Leibniz’s Monadology. 
Rather than referring to any metaphysical or natural law based justification, 
Luhmann develops his normative ideal from empirical observation of social 
evolution. We cannot know how the “next society”128 will look, but we know that, 
historically, functional differentiation brought about unprecedented gains in 
individual freedom and social autonomy. Although the current development of 
society may carry the risk of the end of functional differentiation, and certain 
empirical facts may already be pointing in that direction, we have no choice other 
than to contrafactually pursue functional differentiation as the overriding aim of 
social policy. 
In addition to protecting functional differentiation, fundamental rights also 
protect autonomous communicative spheres of individuals who have been 
emancipated from the constraints of pre-modern social structures.129 As a result of 
modernization, individuals are no longer subject to total inclusion into kingdoms, 
guilds, the church, families and so forth but are free to participate in multiple 
communicative systems and to take different roles in different situations. Individuals 
become bearers of subjective rights that protect this autonomy. Subjective 
fundamental rights can therefore be seen as a kind of compensation for the loss of 
total inclusion into a segment or stratum of a pre-modern type of social 
organization,130 and human rights, strictly speaking, protect the mental and physical 
integrity of human beings against markedly “destructive perturbations of 
communication.”131 
According to Luhmann, fundamental rights are, first and foremost, institutions of 
society.132 They become institutions of the law only after having been reformulated in 
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127  See id. at 69–70. 
128  DIRK BAECKER, STUDIEN ZUR NÄCHSTEN GESELLSCHAFT 169–74 (2007). 
129  See LUHMANN, GRUNDRECHTE ALS INSTITUTION, supra note 93, at 53–83; see also Gert Verschraegen, Human 
Rights and Modern Society: A Sociological Analysis from the Perspective of Systems Theory, 29 J. L. & SOC’Y 258, 
263–64 (2002). 
130  See LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 66, at 417. 
131  Gunther Teubner, The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by ‘Private’ Transnational Actors, 69 MOD. 
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the language of the law. This sociological theory of fundamental rights contrasts 
starkly with classic theories of law and political science, constructing fundamental 
and human rights within frameworks of natural law or political liberalism.133 Those 
theories conceptualize fundamental and human rights as a category of constitutional 
norms whose purpose it is to protect the individual against the power of the nation 
state. From a sociological perspective, such a reductionist understanding of 
fundamental rights, within a triad of individual/power/state, misses their full 
emancipatory potential in today’s hypercomplex society. This is highly problematic 
because in the networked ecology some of the most important constitutional 
questions are not posed by an expanding political system and state actions,134 but, 
rather, originate from the totalizing tendencies of the economic system and some of 
its organizations. These include transnationally acting Internet platforms and 
telecom corporations, which are creating hybrid worlds of governance deeply 
impacting on people’s rights and freedoms. 
It is not the case that no efforts have been made in constitutional rights doctrine 
to somewhat loosen the grip of classic liberal theory. In the United States, the state 
action doctrine has extended constitutional rights disciplines to private actors who 
have either performed a public function or are so close to the government that a clear 
distinction between public and private is not possible.135 In the continental European 
legal tradition, a theory of the horizontal effects of fundamental rights has been 
championed to extend the reach of constitutional rights to private actors.136 However, 
from a sociological perspective, seeking to develop constructs that allow holding 
private individuals accountable is missing the point of fundamental rights.137 You do 
not need fundamental rights for this; private law (tort) or penal law will do. Rather, 
the question should be: what expansive social systems threaten individual and social 
autonomies and how is this related to the current technological conditions of 
society’s self-reproduction? We have seen that organizations are a type of social 
system that are distinguished within Luhmann’s theory. Platforms are organizations 
of the economic system equipped with smart technologies, vast data silos, specialist 
knowledge and the economic means to colonialize individual and social autonomies 
towards de-differentiation. Accordingly, the economic system and its organizations 
should be at the centre of attention in research related to protecting freedom under 
the conditions of the Internet. The concept of freedom, as used in this Article, refers 
to a set of normative expectations related to a sphere of individual or social 
autonomy, the boundaries of which cannot be demarcated irrespective of concrete 
contexts of infringement, and which is dependent on technological affordances and 
social capabilities. 
While it is one thing to ask: “against what do fundamental rights offer 
protection?” it is also necessary to clarify what falls into their scope of protection. 
Regarding this second question, learning from a law and society approach to 
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fundamental rights does not require getting rid of the existing achievements of courts 
and other bodies in fundamental or human rights practice. According to Luhmann, 
fundamental rights guarantee protection on two different levels. First, fundamental 
rights protect individual autonomies of human beings as psychic systems and 
holders of roles (individual dimension). Second, fundamental rights protect the 
autonomy of social discourses (institutional dimension). 
With regard to the first level, standards of fundamental and human rights 
protection of individuals, as beings with minds and bodies and actors in diverse 
social contexts, have been codified and are continually being further developed in the 
practice of national and international courts. Freedom of expression and information, 
and the right to privacy and data protection are of particular importance for 
individuals in the age of data-driven smart technologies.138 In the realm of human 
rights advocacy and policymaking, efforts to extend the reach of existing guarantees 
of communicative freedom or privacy to the Internet realm are being widely 
discussed. An impressive number of attempts to craft an “Internet Bill of Rights” 
have been made over the last twenty-five years, mainly by various civil society 
organizations, business corporations, multi-stakeholder dynamics, public 
international institutions and government agencies.139 
This Article does not want to add a further piece to this already rich body of 
literature. Rather, its focus will be on the institutional dimension, the protection of 
autonomous social discourses under the conditions of a networked digital ecosystem. 
It will address a question that, until now, has received too little attention: whether 
the Internet should be protected as an institution. 
5.2 AFFORDANCES AND NORMATIVE EXPECTATIONS 
Luhmann stands out as a scholar who has been very sensitive towards the 
vulnerability of social order in a hypercomplex society. More than any other social 
theorist he is aware that social order is unlikely under the current conditions of 
contingency and complexity. Since complexity has reached unprecedented levels in 
the face of data-driven smart technologies, and the totalizing tendencies of 
transnational Internet platform corporations are a looming threat, 140  Luhmann’s 
fundamental rights theory is more topical now than it has ever been. Luhmann 
emphasizes that the structures of the functionally differentiated society have 
emerged as a highly improbable result of social evolution and these structures need 
protection because the danger of de-differentiation is real. Historically, fundamental 
rights emerged in the eighteenth century as counter-institutions against the 
colonizing tendencies of the political system and the state. While the state was the 
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only totalizing system until the second half of the twentieth century, that is a mere 
historical contingency. 141 As already mentioned, fundamental rights are not only 
directed against political power and the state, they offer protection against any 
totalizing tendencies of social systems. 
Considering the entangled relationship between communication and the Internet, 
a fundamental right protecting society’s dominant distribution medium against 
colonization seems paramount. When I use the words “Internet” or “net” in this 
context, this is meant to refer to the network infrastructure that we currently know, 
without precluding hitherto unknown technological changes. This infrastructure can 
be compared to a kind of “engine room” of today’s society — a metaphor suggesting 
the outstanding importance of the net for any type of communication and implying 
that decisions taken at this level have repercussions for communicative freedom 
throughout society. Fundamental rights are those institutions of society where 
normative expectations about the protection of individual and social autonomies 
under varying conditions of the natural or technological environment are bundled.  
The question is how normative expectations about technologies and their 
affordances emerge. We have seen that technologies have affordances that are co-
determined in recursive practices of material design and social interpretation. The 
social response to material design is an expression of cognitive or normative 
expectations. According to Luhmann, behavioural expectations are defined as 
cognitive or normative depending on whether they are given up after having been 
disappointed. 142  While cognitive expectations can be given up and thus allow 
learning from disappointment, normative expectations are upheld even in cases 
where they are breached. The expectation, for example, that nobody will steal 
individual property will be upheld even though theft happens frequently. Normative 
expectations can become legal norms if they are contrafactually stabilized.143 In the 
sense of the technological drama, an impact constituency may develop cognitive or 
normative expectations regarding a technology’s affordances. If such expectations 
are normative they will imply that a certain interpretation of a technology’s 
functioning will be considered as a must.  
Normative expectations about new technologies usually emerge from the grass-
roots level. As detailed elsewhere with regard to net neutrality, 144  normative 
expectations regarding the design of the Internet have been emerging bottom-up 
from a specific sub-system of society. In a reflexive process within the economic 
system, between actors of the organized professional sphere (corporations and other 
formal organizations) and the spontaneous sphere (civil society groups), expectations 
related to preserving an open and neutral Internet have come out. In a second stage 
these normative expectations have been reformulated as legal norms and are about to 
enter the legal system. In the United States, an element contributing to the 
juridification of net neutrality was the decision of the Court of Appeals of the DC 
Circuit of June 14, 2016 to uphold an earlier FCC Decision stating that net neutrality 
was a legal norm. 145  This stage of institutionalization of net neutrality as a 
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constitutional right is of course far from being completed as it is not clear how the 
political and legal systems in the United States will respond to the Trump presidency. 
Even when a juridification process is accomplished, constitutional structures would 
have to be developed in a next step, according to Gunther Teubner’s theory of 
societal constitutionalism.146 The acknowledgement by a constitutional court of net 
neutrality as a fundamental right of a nation’s constitution would be a step to 
complete the process of bottom-up constitutionalization.147 
A further realm where normative expectations regarding the Internet’s 
affordances may emerge is the process of online communication. What is at issue are 
people’s normative expectations that their communications over the Internet will not 
be manipulated through opaque third party interferences. A concept that needs to be 
introduced at this point is the communicative inbetween. The “inbetween” plays an 
important role in Hildebrandt’s theorizing about smart technologies’ impact on the 
private sphere of human beings. Inspired by her studies of politeness and privacy 
practices in Japan, Hildebrandt interprets the “inbetween” as an “emptiness of the 
space that holds us apart while constituting us.”148 The “inbetween” is thus a virtual 
empty space in communicative interactions between humans. It establishes a 
minimal distance between participants in communicative interactions, which is a 
prerequisite for a human being’s self-identification. Hildebrandt considers pre-
emptive computing to be dangerous as it “occupies the ‘inbetween’ with projections 
and inferences to which we have little access.” 149  The danger is an 
“overdetermination” by computational decision-making that will pre-empt our 
intent and thus colonize the “inbetween.” 
Hildebrandt’s work focuses on issues of privacy as a subjective fundamental 
right that users can bring to the fore against the negative effects of pre-emptive 
technologies thereon. In my view, the importance of the concept of the “inbetween” 
should not be limited to the right to privacy and individual effects of fundamental 
rights. The concept is relevant beyond the right to privacy and data protection as it 
refers to the integrity of the communication process. If reformulated within Luhmann’s 
communication theory, the “inbetween” would be conceived as referring to a space-
time emptiness in the decoupled but quasi-simultaneous selections of information 
and understanding in the chain of communications. As pre-emptive computing 
invades the communicative inbetween without this being transparent, it has the 
effect of violating the integrity of this emptiness.  
Without explicitly using this term, communicative integrity is a normative 
principle that has first been recognized in a famous decision of the German 
Constitutional Court of 2008. 150  There, the Court held that people relying on 
information technology systems for their communication should be protected in their 
expectations of the technological integrity of those systems. This is a landmark 
decision because this expectation is a prerequisite for people’s ability to enjoy their 
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communicative freedom online. 151  Communicative integrity is a broader concept 
than net neutrality as it is possible to violate communicative integrity under 
conditions with or without net neutrality. In this Article, communicative integrity is 
defined as the absence of non-transparent interferences with an existing information 
technological system, whereas net neutrality is more about the design of a 
telecommunications infrastructure. The German Constitutional Court’s ruling is 
limited in scope as it is restricted to state actions. There is, however, an obvious 
similarity between the measures or software that the Court was trying to protect 
against and the technologies that platform organizations use to monitor or even 
manipulate Internet users’ online behaviour. 
The next section discusses how these two sets of emerging normative 
expectations about the Internet’s communicative affordances — net neutrality and 
communicative integrity — can be reformulated in the framework of Luhmann’s 
theory of fundamental rights as institutions of society. 
5.3 FREEDOM OF THE NET 
Freedom of the net is the (provisional) name for a fundamental right that protects 
the Internet as an institution. Building on the analysis in the previous section, two 
points about the institutional (trans-subjective) dimension of this freedom must be 
made. First, freedom of the net should guarantee protection against a colonization of 
the communicative time-space “inbetween” of the net, which is decisive for 
protecting the integrity of the communication process. As we have seen, a few 
organizations that control data-driven smart technologies are able to materially 
interfere with the process of communication as the synthesis of the selections of 
utterance, information and understanding. Acting as “intermediaries” in a strict 
sense of the term, these platforms are in a position to technically manipulate the 
global “flows of social and public knowledge.”152 What is more, data-driven agency 
of platforms tends to manipulate and ultimately pervert the communication process 
since meaningful human information is replaced by meaningless machine-generated 
information, as Hildebrandt argues. This is because smart technologies may well be 
called intelligent but what distinguishes them from human beings is meaning. The 
human way of existence is characterized by the ability to react on meaningful 
realities, to relate them to past experiences and the emotions that they have left 
behind and to deliberate on their relative importance in discourses with other human 
beings. While human beings are born with the gift to act mindfully, computers are 
only able to simulate mindfulness. Meaning depends on how data is interwoven 
with our life world. The information, however, that smart algorithms are producing 
remains meaningless, even when ML and AI “are capable of second order 
preferences and higher order decision-making.”153 According to Hildebrandt, “we 
should admit that most of the information that is around now is meaningless, but 
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highly influential.”154 It is influential because what data-driven technologies consider 
to be relevant will become relevant in the real life of human beings.155 
Second, freedom of the net should guarantee that the network’s affordances serve 
society’s needs of complexity reduction. What is at stake is society’s autonomy of 
technological self-representation in the networked environment. This is a point that 
relates to decisions about the design of the network infrastructure. Freedom of the 
net should thus safeguard the network’s openness and malleability in response to 
society’s requests for complexity reduction and inclusiveness. The net should remain 
open for new platforms, applications, search engines and entirely new devices and 
services. This goes beyond a competition law perspective and resonates more with 
the old claim that the “pipe” should remain “stupid” so that many types of hardware 
and software can be used to distribute data over the network.156 It also includes a 
non-discrimination rule, which is encapsulated by the principle of net neutrality. In 
the United States for example, the FCC interpreted this principle in a decision of 
February 26, 2015 as a prohibition on providers of fixed and wireless Internet access 
discriminating between types of content that are distributed over the Internet and 
thus to abstain from blocking, throttling or paid prioritization practices.157 While the 
debate on net neutrality in a narrow sense of the word refers to Internet Service 
Providers’ (ISPs) control of the network infrastructure,158 the case of Facebook’s Free 
Basics in India shows that the role of platform firms should not be ignored in this 
context. In 2013, Facebook launched the Free Basics (originally branded Internet.org) 
initiative, arguably with the philanthropic intention of extending free Internet access 
to first-time users in Africa, Asia and Latin America.159 When implemented in 2015 in 
India, Free Basics (then Internet.org) was running over an “app” on mobile devices 
that granted free access to only a select number of sites. Coordinated critique from 
more than 65 civil society organisations around the world 160  eventually forced 
Facebook to extend its offer (under the new name of Free Basics) to a larger number 
of websites, provided that they respected the corporation’s terms of access and 
technical regulations. The set-up required a deal between Facebook and RCom, its 
Indian telecom partner,161 that provided access to the “walled garden”162 over its 
mobile network. Even if Facebook’s claims are true that it never paid RCom for its 
services163 it indirectly paid with its own brand, helping the partner ISP to advertise 
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its services. 164  In return, the exclusive deal helped Facebook to increase the 
popularity of its brand with the effect of distorting the market and hurting start ups 
and other competitors.165 What is more, Facebook received access to a market of 1 
billion mobile users (and their data) with so far low Internet access penetration.166 
Free Basics India came to an end on February 8, 2016 after TRAI — the Indian 
Telecom Regulator — barred telecom service providers from charging differential 
rates for data services. TRAI’s decision, justified with reference to the net neutrality 
principle, was a response to massive civil society protests against Facebook’s plans.167 
The civil society campaign led by SaveTheInternet.in mostly took issue with 
Facebook’s attempt to “tether users to its product and monopolize the terms of access 
to the wider Internet, so compromising the tenets of network neutrality.”168 
While the principle of net neutrality is important and much can be learned from 
its regulatory history in several jurisdictions, network infrastructure openness is 
broader and should extend to AI openness. Although research on AI openness is at a 
very early stage, there are influential voices arguing that a competitive situation 
between AI developers would be beneficial from a public policy perspective.169 In 
terms of policy goals, data openness is considered to be even more important than 
equal access to algorithms or source code. 170  This has to do with the already 
mentioned fact that large data sets are required to make algorithms more effective. 
Questions going beyond the scope of this Article refer to the many regulatory issues 
that such a policy scenario would trigger. What this Article suggests is that the 
overarching regulatory goal should be to prevent AI designification and to make 
sure that the technological drama continues. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article has been to show that from a further development of 
the material side of Luhmann’s sociological systems theory, and marriage with a 
theory of technological affordances, important new insights can be gained for the 
role of technology and the Internet in the theory of fundamental rights. While it is 
true that technological materialities in general, and the Internet in particular, do not 
occupy a particularly prominent position in Luhmann’s writings it would be a fatal 
misunderstanding to follow from this that autopoiesis theory is “technologically 
blind” or unfit to analyse technology-induced challenges for contemporary society 
and its legal system. Luhmann’s theory is constructed as a theory of communication 
involving decisions about the theory’s design that have certain implications. One 
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implication is that the theory’s elements are not atoms or agents (human or artificial) 
or language, but communications. 
Luhmann’s definition of communication as the synthesis of the selections of 
utterance, information and understanding is the starting point to developing a 
material extension of autopoiesis theory and linking up with a theory of affordances. 
One of the autopoiesis theory’s important themes refers to the correlation between 
societal complexity and the distribution medium that is dominant in a given society. 
Accordingly the Internet has become the dominant distribution medium of 
contemporary society because it is the only such medium that is capable of coping 
with hypercomplexity. The point is that the Internet has affordances that increase 
social complexity while at the same time offering mechanisms of complexity 
management. 
Affordance is a concept that allows the relationship between materiality and 
sociality to be conceived in a way that avoids the ideological constrictions of both 
technological determinism and social constructivism. The former conceives 
technology as something that determines how it can be used in society and wants to 
make us believe that society is at technology’s mercy. Conversely, the perspective of 
social constructivism starts from the (opposite) premise that technology is just a 
social construct and that it is always society that shapes a technology. Distinct from 
both extremes, the theory of affordance — fleshed out with the help of 
Pfaffenberger’s technological drama and applied to digital artefacts — shows how 
the relationship between technology and society is one of reciprocity and mutual 
influence rather than unilateral determination or construction. 
Such a theory allows us to see that the Internet as a distribution medium affords 
communication that is simultaneous and ubiquitous at the same time. As with other 
electronic media of the twentieth century, the Internet decouples the relationships 
between information and understanding. Yet, the combination with Machine 
Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) engenders profound structural changes 
in online communication, as opaque control mechanisms interfere with the 
relationship between information and understanding. The spread of ML and AI 
technologies jeopardizes the integrity of communicative selections to the extent that 
mutual interpretation is replaced by unilateral predictions and simulations without 
this being sufficiently transparent. 
Luhmann’s theory is primarily descriptive. A change of perspective is involved 
when an autopoiesis theory–informed analysis switches from the observation and 
description of socio-technological interactions to normative conclusions in the realm 
of the law. Within fundamental rights theory a step from “is” to “ought” can be 
reconstructed as the emergence and subsequent juridification of normative 
expectations. Empirical research about net neutrality confirms that normative 
expectations related to the functioning of the Internet as an essential communicative 
infrastructure are emerging bottom-up, from the middle of society. Juridification 
occurs, in a second step, if these normative expectations are being reformulated in 
the language of the law. An ensuing constitutionalization of juridified norms would 
require a reflexive process within the law, involving a second order observation 
applying a distinction juxtaposing the values “constitutional” and “unconstitutional.” 
The new smart technologies afford platform companies to take decisions and 
manipulate behaviour through predictions of users’ communications and actions. For 
their part, users will not be aware when the integrity of their communicative 
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selections is violated through ML and AI driven control interventions and 
simulations. The communicative inbetween is introduced as a normative concept 
referring to a virtual time-space interval that needs to be protected against 
manipulation to secure users’ expectations in the integrity of online communication. 
Text as an externalized memory of communication is being replaced with ML 
technologies that continuously re-actualize time-space relationships in the Big Data 
space. Although ML affords highly effective complexity management, the 
availability of such strategies is potentially limited to platform companies that are 
able to train algorithms with large stocks of data. Control over Big Data and 
intelligent algorithms thus becomes a topic of social policy. 
From a normative perspective, fundamental rights need to protect functional 
differentiation and individual and social autonomies in a technology-neutral way — 
that is, irrespective of what a society’s dominant dissemination medium looks like. 
While such a normative conclusion has been drawn in the present Article with 
respect to the specific problem of protecting freedom of the net, more general 
questions regarding the determination of a normative aim in a socio-legal theory will 
be clarified in a forthcoming book. 
To summarize, a convergence between autopoiesis theory, affordance theory and 
fundamental rights theory leads to the conclusion that fundamental rights protection 
in a hypercomplex society needs to include affordances of the digital ecosystem. 
Freedom of the net should first protect the integrity of Internet-based communication 
against opaque interferences from organizations of the economic system. Second, 
freedom of the net should protect society’s expectations about the Internet’s capacity 
for complexity management. This postulate refers to society’s technological self-
representation and decisions about the network’s design. Overall, law (and ensuing 
regulation) should make sure that the technological drama does not drop out of the 
Internet. 
 
